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1.0 Introduction
Professions often act in strongly institutionalized contexts which affect and regulate their rights, duties, roles and autonomy. At the same time professions may be seen as the example par excellence of social actors able to affect their institutional contexts in order to protect their professional autonomy (Scott 2008). Because of this interplay changes in professions autonomy can partly be explained by influence from institutional changes and partly by more or less deliberate and strategic professional reactions. This is well known in the literature on professions and institutions (Kuhlmann 2006, Leicht & Fennell 2008). What haven’t received sufficient attention is how different types of institutional change affect professions and their autonomy? And how these changes are affected by different types of professions? We will address these questions by firstly exploring: how do different types of institutional change affect the autonomy of two different types of professions. And secondly: how can we begin to explain differences in the reactions of the professions with focus on the question of autonomy. 

The research questions are explored by a comparative case-study of different professions: Danish health care professions and the civil service. While the health professions generally are considered as the archetype of classic professions the profession of Danish civil service is characterised by differences in educational background and no official monopoly in relation to administrative work. In spite of these formal traits Danish civil service, we will argue, that the service may be characterised as a profession The idea in the following sections is first to focus on theories of institutional change which include collective action by professions and second to analyse and compare the institutional changes the two professions have experienced and the corresponding reactions from the professions. 

In the discussion we will focus on the significance of different types of institutional change for professional autonomy in different kinds of profession. We then discuss the ways different professions collective actions modify and shape institutional changes and ends up with a discussion of the implications of our findings compared to other studies. The focus is on the changing forms of professional autonomy and the ways that professionalism itself is changed through interactions between institutional change and professional collective action.  

We conclude that no matter what kind of profession and institutional change the professions act collectively and that professional collective action affect institutional change and contribute to the preservation or change of professional autonomy and professionalism itself. The characteristics of the field, the kind of institutional change and the collective actions of the professions seem to be connected in coherent sets each with its own character. This contrasts with common conceptions of professions as being either carriers of predetermined professional norms and traditions or strategic actors defending classic professional autonomy at every occasion.

2.0 Theories of Institutional Change and Professional Autonomy
The theoretical frame in the paper is based on Hargrave and Van de Ven’s recent typololgy of institutional changes (2006). The typology is supplemented by the concept of institutional logics, which enables an analysis of the scope of changes within institutional contexts and arrangements (Friedland & Alford 1991). In order to understand and explain the reactions of the professions the paper aslo includes elements from the sociology of professions focusing on the autonomy of the professions. 

2.1 Institutional Change 
Following Hargrave and Van de Ven’s typology of institutional changes (2004; 2006) we differentiate between four types of institutional changes: Institutional diffusion, institutional adaptation, institutional design and collective action (Hargrave & Van de Ven 2006:878-880). 
Hargrave and Van de Ven acknowledge the importance of institutional actors but do not explicate how they should be defined. We suggest a definition of institutional actors, as individuals acting collectively as organisations or, as in our case, professions. Institutional changes are changes in institutional arrangements form, quality or state over time (2006:866) and in more operational terms institutional changes may be identified as changes in institutional frames, norms and/or rules over time. 

Various types of institutional change differ in a number of ways. In the following section we present different types of changes. The types of change and the dimensions are summarised in table 1, which is inspired by tables published in Hargrave & Van de Ven (2004; 2006). The table has been revised by adding the professions as examples of actors as well as their organisations and their environments. 

Table 1: Dimensions of Different types of Institutional Change 
Dimension	Institutional design	Institutional adaptation	Institutional diffusion	Collective action 
Focal institutional actors	Individual entrepreneurial actor(s) with bounded agency: affordance and partisan mutual adjustment	Individual actors adapting (proactively or reactively) to institutional arrangements 	Population or industry of professionalised organisations exposed to same institutional environments 	Networks of distributed and partisan actors in an interorganisational field. 
Focus 	Zoom in on single actor as for example a profession	Zoom in on single actor as for example a profession	Zoom out on multiple actors in interorganisational field as for example professions, the state, interest organisations, various political actors	Zoom out on multiple actors in interorganisational field as for example professions, the state, interest organisations, various political actors
Mode of change 	Construction 	Reproduction 	Reproduction 	Construction 
Generative mechanism 	Purposeful social construction and strategies by a actor to solve a problem or protect professional interests and autonomy 	Institutional beliefs, pressures, or regulations to which organisational actors must adapt to be legitimate 	Competition for scare resources forces actor to imitate and conform to legitimate institutional environment 	Recognition of an institutional problem, barrier, or injustice among professions and other collective actors 
Process: event sequence 	A dialectical process of creating working rules that resolve conflicts or address unprecedented cases	Coercive, normative, and mimetic processes change	Evolutionary processes of variation, selection, and retention of institutional forms	Processes of framing and mobilising structures and opportunities for institutional reform 
Outcome 	New ‘rules of the game’ that enable and constrain actors by changing their rights, duties, roles and/or autonomy 	Organisational efforts to achieve legitimacy by adopting institutional arrangements 	Institutionalisation or deinstitutionalisation in a population of actors 	Institutional precedent, a new or changed working rule, and institutional innovation 

Although the types differ as reflected in table 1, there are also similarities, in terms of institutional diffusion and adaptation being concerned with institutional changes as reproduction and institutional design and collective action being concerned with institutional construction (Hargrave & Van de Ven 2006:881). The four types of institutional change are not necessary mutually excluding when institutional changes are subject for empirical analysis. Rather, one could expect that processes of institutional change may resemble different types at various stages in the process of change and institutionalisation. I.e. in the initial emergence phase, traits from the institutional design model may be dominant, whereas “Collective action processes become more evident during the developmental phase of institutional change, when networks of actors emerge to introduce competing alternative approaches or designs that entail different proposals for institutional change.” (Hargrave & Van de Ven 2006:883, original italicises). And finally may institutional adaptation and diffusion be central when characterising the implementation faces of institutional changes. 

Institutional change as institutional design, adaptation and diffusion is well established in the literature on institutional change and the collective action model added by Hargrave and Van de Ven, makes it possible to address issues of conflict, power and political behaviour in processes of institutional change in institutional fields. I.e. the collective action emphasizes, that the creation of institutions entails conflict, power and mobilisation of political behaviour, and these aspects becomes evident when the institutional change process moves from being a question of institutional design by a single actor to a process where change is to be institutionalised in the organisational field.
 
As will evident in the analysis the processes chosen for empirical investigation is primarily phases of creating and diffusion of new institutions and this is why we primarily focuses on institutional change as institutional design, diffusion and collective action. Given that the ambition of the paper is to identify how professions react in changes challenging their autonomy we are especially concerned with how different types of professions act in creating and/or revising institutional arrangements in order to maximize their interests and autonomy (institutional design). Then  how professions act as carriers of institutional and professional norms, rules etc. within fields (institutional diffusion).And finally  how different types of professions act as partisan actors in order to maximize interests and autonomy in the process of changing institutional arrangements within the organisational field (the collective action model). 

Changes in institutional arrangements affecting the professions may, however, not only be characterised according to the type of change, but as importantly according to the scope of change. Hence institutional changes may involve a change in institutional logics or archetypes (Friedland & Alford 1991; Greenwood & Hinings 1993; Hinings 2005)), or be interpreted as sedimentation processes where new interpretive schemes structures and systems are layered on pre-existing institutional logics or archetypes. 

2.2 Professional Autonomy 
Institutional change certainly affects professions in more than one respect but changes that affect the autonomy at the level of society and/or at the level of working practices can be expected to trigger collective reactions from the profession. In the following section we will outline how the theme of professional autonomy has been treated in the sociology of the professions in order to establish a typology of professional autonomy. The typology will then be used in the analysis in order to understand and characterise the reactions of the professions. 

The theme of professional autonomy has been central in the sociology of the professions already in the so-called trait approach (Evetts 2006). At the level of professions, recognized monopoly was mentioned as one defining trait of a profession, and at the level of the individual professional technical autonomy in relation to professional work was also mentioned. Later the “power” approach shifted the analytical focus towards professionalisation and “professional projects” (Larson 1977, Abbott 1988; Macdonald 1995; Freidson 2001) and a central element in professional projects was the question of autonomy. 

Later relations between the professions and the state was brought back into the analysis of professionalisation and illustrated the importance of the specific national and institutional contexts for the shaping of conceptions of professional autonomy at both a collective and an individual level (Dent 2003, Degeling et al. 2006). Governance structures and the interaction between professions and the state in different countries determine the institutional and organisational framework in which professions and professionals seek to maintain their autonomy (Kragh Jespersen et al.2002). The strategies of the professions are considered important (Kirkpatrick & Ackroyd 2003a), and successful professional projects secured a form of “double social closure” whereby closure in the labour market was combined with control inside organisations (Ackroyd 1996). 

Summing up recent research within the sociology of the professions demonstrates the need for context-sensitive studies and suggests that professions’ reactions to institutional change depend on the kind of institutional change, the overall institutional structures and governance traditions as well as the interests of the professions. First it seems to play a role for the reactions of the professionals whether the change explicitly aims at confronting the autonomy of the professions (Degeling et al. 2006; Kragh Jespersen 2006; Kirkpatrick et al. 2009). Second reforms requiring collaboration across professions are likely to be retarded or decoupled (Ferlie et al.2005; Fitzgerald & Dopson 2005) and top-down initiated reforms requiring changes in professional beliefs and culture and the use of extraprofessional output measures are difficult to implement even if they are sustained for long periods (Kirkpartick et al. 2004). To get a more detailed picture of the concept of professional autonomy and the direction it might change we need to elaborate and refine the concept. 

Table 2 illustrates our preliminary suggestion for such an elaboration. It is based on reviews of recent literature on professions which recognizes that the classical autonomy of the professions might be changing in the direction of competitive autonomy reflecting major institutional changes in most countries (Kuhlmann 2006, Nigam 2006)  The idea in the typology is to illustrate, that the classic type of professional autonomy may be vanishing or replaced by another kind of autonomy, where the individual profession will have to compete with other professions, other actors trying to regulate the profession and its work and with clients trying to impose their own logics or agenda into professional work.

Table 2: Typology of Professional Autonomy
Dimensions in Professional Autonomy	Classical Professional Autonomy	Competitive Professional Autonomy
Degree of monopoly	Recognized monopoly over certain kinds of work and Control with areas of abstract scientific knowledge  	Open competition between professions about work areas and control with knowledge
Degree of boundary control	Professions control boundaries and the regulation and development of professional work	Boundaries disputed and changing
Degree of control of problem definitions	Professionals define and solve problems in relation to clients 	Recognition of both managerial and professional knowledge
Degree of management control	Professionals active in management of organisations and professional work 	Joint management decision making with several professions involved
Kind of professional identity	Professional identities  defined in mono-professional communities of practice  	Professional identities are diverse and defined in multi-professional practices
Kind of accountability	Professional accountable to clients and colleagues     	Professionals together accountable to the public and clients

The typology reflects that different professions might move along the different dimensions and that mixed forms of autonomy might occur for different kinds of professions.

Summing up: the theoretical framework of the paper implies that different types of institutional changes will affect the professions and that the professions will react as collective actors in the organisational field trying to affect institutional changes in favour of the profession especially if and when their autonomy is threatened.

The theoretical model of the paper is illustrated in figure 1:






Figure 1: The Theoretical Model





The main idea with this model is not the identification of an expected relation between various types of institutional change and autonomy, but the identification of different roles and/or collective (re) actions of the professions in the process of institutional change, when explaining how different types of institutional change affect different types of professions’ autonomy as well as how different types of professions collective actions affect the institutional changes. Further, as will be evident in the subsequent case-analysis, the causality suggested in the model is complex, and the causal relation between professions’ autonomy and institutional changes reciprocal. Changes in professions’ autonomy also potentially affect the institutional changes, as professions act in order to preserve their autonomy.

3.0 Research Design and Methods 
The research design is a comparative case-design, designed to identify the mechanism(s) whereby institutional changes affect professions’ autonomy (Gerring 2004; Tsoukas 1989). We want to explore how different types of institutional change affect professions’ autonomy and to begin the identification of possible explanations of differences in the reactions of the two professions. This is why we choose a comparative case-design. As the paper has an explorative ambition the cases are not chosen in order to meet a systematic criterion as suggested by a most-similar or most different design (Friendries 1983; Salomonsen & Bureau forthcoming). Instead the more pragmatic criteria for choosing cases is firstly to have different types of professions and secondly to include different types of institutional changes. In order to maximize the differences in cases we have chosen classic professions, medicine and nursing, as well as a profession, which, until recently, haven’t been paid much attention in the literature on professions, civil servants. In terms of institutional changes we have chosen processes which differ in terms of how they are initiated. The more specific differences are elaborated in the course of analysis, and thus used as criteria we a priori have set for the selection of change processes. 

To develop the analysis of the two cases concerning the health professions we draw primarily on a range of secondary data sources from the academic and healthcare policy literature in Denmark. This means relying on studies with varying baselines and research questions. However, such data can give a rich picture of the institutional changes, the discourses and reactions of the professions and how they over time have understood and reacted when their autonomy has been threatened. In addition to these secondary sources the paper will also draw on qualitative case studies conducted by one of the authors focusing on NPM inspired institutional changes in the Danish hospital field.

In the case-analysis of the civil service we also include different types of data. Hence we include qualitative interviews and various types of documents including white papers and articles in journals and news papers. Most of these data was originally collected for a research project on Danish civil servants political advice from 1980 onwards. The interviews were conducted in the Ministry of the Interior and Health as well as the Ministry of the Environment in the spring of 2002. In addition the case-analysis of the civil service also draws on academic literature on Danish civil service.

4.0 Analysis
The following section contains a detailed analysis of institutional change and professional autonomy in Danish health professions and civil service. 

4.1 Institutional Changes in the Health Care Sector and the Autonomy of the Health Professions.
The Danish health care field is a mature organisational field characterised by public ownership and regulation through political-administrative decisions. The governance structure is a combination of overall central regulation combined with strong political decentralization and county ownership of hospitals and governance of general practitioners. The position of the central health care professions (doctors and nurses) has traditionally been strong in Danish health care (Kragh Jespersen 2005) Dominant values are equal and free access to treatment for patients according to professional judgment. 

The Danish health care has during the 1980s and 1990s field been subject to reforms inspired by New Public Management strategies such as outsourcing, activity based budgeting, changed management models and systematic quality development. Also the position of patients in relation to health professionals and hospitals has been strengthened including patients complaints boards from 1988, free choice of hospitals from 1993, new rules about informed consent to treatments 1998 and access to patient records and better patient insurance schemes 1992 and 1997 (Ministry of Health, 1998). These institutional changes potentially challenge the autonomy of the health care professions and the individual professional in relation to patients as well as the overall legitimacy of the profession. According to our theoretical model we would expect the professions to act collectively as partisan actors in the process of institutional change in order to protect their autonomy.  

Most reforms in the 1980s and 90s have been initiated by public commissions and afterwards negotiated between the County Councils Association and the Government. After having reached consensus at the central level the counties were supposed to implement the reforms and this “model of inspiration” (Kragh Jespersen 2002) lead to variation in results. The strong position of  health professions was to a large extent maintained during the NPM period because the dominant policy was to integrate the professionals in the NPM strategy. The institutional constellation was coherent and dominated by professional values and widespread consensus about the political-administrative structure. In terms of archetypes the Danish field could be labeled as an administrative-professional archetype in the 1908’s and 90’s (Kragh Jespersen, Nielsen & Sognstrup 2002; Kirkpatrick & Ackroyd 2003a; 2003b). No single actor tried to change the institutional constellation in any fundamental way ad instead gradual changes within the path of a decentralized and professional dominated system prevailed (Møller Pedersen, Christiansen & Bech 2005)
 
After 8 years of governments led by Social Democrats, a conservative-liberal government took power in 2001. This has caused a marked change in both the governance and institutional structures in the Danish heath care field. The counties were criticized for being ineffective, more centralized and activity-based budgets were introduced, free choice of hospitals for patients was expanded and health care policy-making became centralized. In 2004 the government initiated a general local government reform where the counties were replaced by larger regions, still with directly elected councils, but without taxation rights and authorization to freely decide local health care policies. The reform became effective in 2007. Although the reform did not basically change the health care system, but national authorities (The Ministry of Health and the National Board of Health) have become more important as their formal power in relation to the new regions have increased. All health care activities in hospitals and primary care are now regulated by the Ministry of Health within the frames of a new comprehensive and rather detailed health care act from 2005 (Ministry of Health 2005). 

So it seems that there are clear indications that the Danish development after 2001 can be interpreted as “the end of the decentralized Scandinavian model” (Byrkjeflot & Neby 2008; Vrangbæk & Christiansen 2005). The institutional changes have been characterised as an attempt to change the institutional logic in the health care field from a classic bureau-professional logic to a management and market logic (Sehested 2002). On the face of it the Danish tradition for consensus making and institutional change through diffusion and imitation in the field is vanishing causing a decrease in the considerable influence health professions had enjoyed in the past (Kragh Jespsersen 2005; Kirkpatrick et.al. 2009). However, if we take a closer look at specific reforms this might modify or perhaps change this general impression by revealing the complex processes involved in institutional change in a professionalised organisational field. 

Within the context described above we now examine two different but interrelated institutional changes in detail. First changes in management models and second the introduction of a Danish model for quality assurance and development in hospitals. Both changes are initiated top-down and might affect the autonomy of the medical profession as it threatens the medical monopoly in relation to management (Sognstrup 2003) and their knowledge monopoly in relation to quality definitions and working practices (Lehmann Knudsen et.al. 2008). In this way they are indicative of changes in the relation between the State, the health professions and the patients and represent important initiatives to regulate and change the autonomy of the professions.

4.1.1 Institutional Changes in Hospital Management
Management at the hospital level has traditionally been dominated by doctors. Management was divided between three parallel professional hierarchies (Mintzberg 1983) with a doctor, a nurse and a general manager. At the clinical level each consultant was also the clinic manager. There was also a head nurse at each clinic and the nurses controlled their own work but had to recognise the doctors as the leading profession. These models had been institutionalised during a very long period without interference from “external” forces, and were considered by the medical profession as the “natural” way. In terms of institutional change this development can be seen as a classical case of path dependency and incremental change and neither a result of professional intended strategies nor efforts from the state to control the professions. 

a) Incorporation of Health Professions in Hospital Management
Following the first Danish NPM program published in 1983 a Government white paper recommended that economic responsibility should be decentralised to the clinic level and management models changed away from management of daily professional routines to more general management (Ministry of the Interior 1984). The commission (consisting of experts, civil servants and health professionals) recommended different management models with participation of doctors and nurses both at hospital and clinic level. In this way the incorporation of the two important professions in management became part of the Danish NPM template. The 1984 paper was an explicit attempt to change the existing management models by designing different models at the national level. In the years after 1984 the new models were disseminated in the hospital field. All counties choose the same troika model (with a doctor, a nurse and a general manager responsible for hospital management) and different varieties of a joint management model at the clinical level (all with a doctor and a nurse in the management team). 

This institutional change has been interpreted as an isomorphic change by imitation and diffusion between counties (Bentsen 2000), but the collective actions of the professions and conflicts between the nurses and doctors seem to be as important. The nursing profession wanted to be recognized as a profession on equal terms with doctors in relation to management and they claimed that nurses were better educated in administration and organisation than doctors and saw the joint management model as a new arena for this ambition. The medical profession, on the other hand, preferred a unitary model at the clinical level with the leading consultant as the only head of clinics and strongly opposed the joint management model. In 1985 the County Council of Funen was the first after the 1984 white paper to decide upon a joint clinic management model where the head nurse and the leading consultant shared the managerial responsibilites. The Danish Medical Association did not accept this model and instructed its members not to apply for management positions in Funen County. This embargo was effective and lasted two years and no other county introduced joint management models during the conflict. When the medical association and the County Council of Funen came to an agreement in 1998 with doctors and nurses sharing clinic management and thereby recognized nurses interests in general and financial management while doctors alone became responsible for medical treatment. After the end of the conflict this version of the joint management model was quickly disseminated and in the early 1990s it was widespread in the field.

This first NPM-inspired attempt to change the management structure illustrates the interplay between a decentralised institutional structure, professional norms about management and collective professional actions. Both doctors and nurses act as partisan actors trying to maximize their interests in the institutional change process and the change in management models would probably never have been implemented without support from strong political and administrative actors supporting the general NPM strategy where decentralisation of economic responsibility and centralised budget control was part of the Danish strategy. But the joint management model at the clinical level could only be institutionalised through a local compromise where the management projects of the two professions to some degree were acknowledged. The traditional unitary medical management model was at the same time deinstitutionalised with help from the nurses. 

b) Unitary Management on the Agenda: Recentralization and Revival of the Medical Management Project
The medical profession succeeded in maintaining their control over medical treatment after 1984. They never officially recognized the joint management model and continued to argue against the model (Kragh Jespersen 2005; 2006).

The next institutional change was once again caused by the publication of a government white paper from the second Hospital Commission in 1997 (Ministry of Health1997). They focused on quality problems in hospitals and suggested a new management concept called unitary management in order to improve the management of quality development. The recent institutionalised joint management models did not, according to the commission, ensure accountability and clinical managers were accused of leaving problems unsolved in case of disagreement between doctors and nurses in the team. The new principle of unitary management was recommended by the Government and the Association of County Councils in 1999 in the annual agreement paper: “The parties do agree to encourage a principle of unambiguous management at all levels in the hospital sector” (Ministry of Finance 1999) but again the implementation of the new concept was left to the counties. The new concept was inspired by a more general development in the Danish NPM strategy in the 1990s where unitary management models were introduced in several areas along with the introduction of standards for output and quality. It was designed by the central actors in the field, but the Danish Medical Association saw an opportunity to reinvent the old unitary management. 

The medical association quickly translated the new concept in a way that promoted their traditional management project. Unitary management became translated into management by doctors, and they supported the commission’ critique of the joint management model, even if the majority of leading consultants did support the joint management according to evaluations (Kragh Jespersen 2005; Evalueringscentret 2000). In the years after 1997, the medical association once again acted locally and obtained agreements with some counties reviving the unitary medical management model in some of the bigger clinics typically with a nurse as vice manager. The nurses’ association did not take collective action, did not participate in the local agreements and seemed to take a position where the control of care was more important than the equal status with doctors in management. 


c) The Picture of Today
Management models have not been part of the reform agenda in the years after 2000. At the hospital level the most important change since 2000 is the merger of hospitals under the same management team. The troika model is still the dominant model and in most cases with three members together responsible for management and the general manager in a position as hospital director. At the clinical level most counties have still a modified joint management model with the leading consultant and the head nurse sharing the management. Usually doctors gets the final say. In most of the new and larger units in hospitals, such as clinical centres and function bearing units (Borum 2004) the principle of unitary management has been reintroduced. General managers are still not found in line positions at lower levels, but there are some economist, accountants and other specialists in staff positions in the bigger units. This development seems to be influenced by local developments such as hospital mergers and regional preferences combined with local negotiations between regions and the professions. During the last years doctors have improved their position in relation to clinical management and the management project of the nurses have suffered, but still the dominant model at the clinical level is the joint management model an the two dominant professions are still solidly represented both at the hospital level and especially at the clinical level.

Summing up the institutional changes in the management models in the 1980s and 90s have been designed and introduced from the national level by government commissions and diffused in the field by imitation and local translation. The collective actions of the Medical and Nurses Associations have been important and they have acted collectively but locally when convenient. In this way both professions have defended and in some periods also expanded their autonomy in relation to management. Even if the new management models have been inspired by NPM strategies and ideas about general management this has not to any significant degree changed the management models at the clinical level which is most important for professional autonomy but at the hospital level general management thinking seems to be more prominent especially after 2000. 

4.1.2 Institutional Change in Hospital Quality Development 
As in most other countries, (Kirkpatrick & Lucio 1995; Exworthy 1998; Blomgren 2007), systematic quality development in health care has been a part central of the Danish NPM. Based on the literature about the management of health care quality some general points can be made about quality improvement in health care in general and hospitals in particular (Øvretveit 2001; Neale, Vincent & Darzi 2007):

	Health care organisations are increasingly expected by governments and patients to invent and implement quality control and improvement strategies.
	No single approach seems to dominate. There are many different strategies and ways to encourage hospitals and the medical profession to participate. There are many examples of lack of engagement from doctors.
	There is little research about the effectiveness of different quality schemes but clinical guidelines combined with efforts from local management seem to improve quality. There is some research into local team projects which shows that “continuous quality improvement” approaches can be effective.
	The role of the health professions seems to be important both in defining, interpreting and implementing quality development schemes, but they are not alone. General managers and other professions are also important in the construction and implementation. 

On the one hand the issue of quality seems to be an important element in the NPM strategy being an integrated and necessary part of the efforts to make the health care sector more effective and reliable data about quality makes it possible to evaluate changes in effectiveness over time and to compare institutions. On the other hand the quality issue also affects the core of professional autonomy. At the level of society it is important for the profession to control and protect the knowledge base including definitions of quality and quality measures and faced with NPM inspired concepts such as total quality management, balanced scorecards, organisational quality and patient satisfaction their professional conception of quality might be weakened. At the organisational level professionals have to interpret and implement new conceptions which might affect professional traditions and routines and their own position in relation to other professionals. So there are arguments to support that the quality issue can be among the best cases for the study of changing professional autonomy in health care. Compared to the development of management models it seems to be a more complex issue where many actors and many different quality regimes could be active.

Quality Development in Danish Hospitals
Before the 1980s quality issues was left to the health professionals and quality indicators were developed within each profession. The first systematic, organisational embedded and managed policy about quality development in Denmark was developed in the early 90s. Unlike the management models it was not inspired by contemporary NPM strategies but instead by the WHO European office who in 1982 recommended all countries to introduce systematic quality development schemes. (WHO1981). The National Board of Health adopted the WHO concept in the early 1990s and the first national strategy for quality development was developed in 1993 with participation from the professions. The first strategy did not recommend specific quality schemes but encouraged the counties and municipalities to use quality circles inspired by Total Quality Management ideas  and encouraged the medical societies to create clinical databases (National Board of Health 1993). This phase has been named a period of cooperation, consensus and voluntariness (Lehmann Knudsen, Christensen & Hansen 2008). During the 1990s the Board of Health published a number of quality recommendations and guides to counties and hospitals but the actual development was however diverse and locally determined. Some counties adopted the TQM concept while other focused on clinical indicators and patients evaluations and alongside that, medical societies developed their own databases and indicators for quality. In 1997 the hospital commission recommended that the quality development should be given priority and that different initiatives should be coordinated. In 1999 the National Board of Health encouraged the counties to give priority to quality issue and to optimise clinical pathways and patient-focused evaluations (National Board of Health 1999:12). As in the management case a local initiative became important when the County of Aarhus developed a quality programme with focus on standards and indicators suitable for the measurement of treatment and care results. This programme was later developed into a National Indicator Project supported by the Association of County Councils, the Professional Associations and the Ministry of Health and later incorporated into The Danish Health Care Quality Assessment Programme. The idea was to develop quality indicators in order to: “Improve the quality of prevention, diagnostics, treatment and rehabilitation, provide documentation for making priorities and inform about the quality in health care to patients and consumers” (NIP projektet 2008). Late in the 1990s the Copenhagen Hospital Corporation decided to implement accreditation schemes using the Joint Commission International Accreditation (JCIA) scheme. In the late 1990s the Danish system for quality improvement in hospitals thus appeared as fragmented and characterised by lack of coordination and many different concepts and priorities. 

The Danish medical association preferred the national indicator project and the use of clinical data bases and was sceptical in relation to the use of patient surveys and total quality management inspired concepts. The Association describes the role of doctors and others in quality development like this: “Quality development in relation to medical service is the responsibility of the profession, because only the profession has the special knowledge needed for the evaluation and safeguarding of quality. This binding professional autonomy is under press from outside-patients and health care authorities- who demand insight in the quality of medical services”. (Danish Medical Association 2005:1, our translation)). 


In 1999 a National Council for Quality development with broad representation including the Medical and the Nurses Association was created in order to coordinate the diverse initiatives and to propose a new national strategy for Quality development. They proposed a new strategy in the health care sector in 2002 and pointed to the need for systematic benchmarking and other kinds of systematic comparison between hospitals and departments in order to facilitate patients free choice of hospitals. The new national strategy departed from the hitherto decentralised policy making and proposed a national model for quality development in order to monitor and evaluate the general development in health care quality (Det Nationale Råd 2002:23). Such a National Danish model for quality was created in 2004 (Danish Health Care Quality Assessment Programme, 2004) following an agreement between the Government and the Association of County Councils in 2001 (Ministry of Finance 2001). The reactions form the health professions were generally positive following their direct participation in the construction of the model, but nevertheless they also maintained some very classical viewpoints in order to protect or safeguard their professional knowledge.

This is clear when the Danish Medical Association describes the role of doctors and others in quality development like this in a policy paper from 2005: “Quality development in relation to medical service is the responsibility of the profession, because only the profession has the special knowledge needed for the evaluation and safeguarding of quality. This binding professional autonomy is under press from outside-patients and health care authorities- who demand insight in the quality of medical services”. (Danish Medical Association 2005:1, our translation).

The nurses were more open but used the opportunity to make it clear that nursing like medical work should be scientifically based. The Nurses Association published a paper about nursing work in 2006 stating that: “Nurses shall be active in the implementation of research based knowledge in nursing and in other professional areas in order to optimize the total pathway of care and treatment. We shal also develop new kinds of knowledge through research and development together with researchers and developers in nursing” (DSR 2006, our translation)

The formation of the new national model implied that the decentralised model was abolished. The new and more ambitious model is based on the use of common standards for clinical, organisational and patient recorded quality together with internal and external evaluation (accreditation) and publication of results. The overall goal is to promote effective patient pathways and ensure that the patients experience improved quality. A new independent Danish Institute for Quality and Accreditation in Healthcare was established in 2005 and has developed the first operative version of the model in 2008.It is defined by the institute as an accreditation system which aims at continuous quality development of clinical pathways through learning and benchmarking (IKAS 2008). The new model has not been implemented and it is likely that implementation will be costly and require the cooperation of many different actors. The Danish Medical Association considered in a hearing in 2007 that the model was appropriate but also that: “ …it would be extremely costly in terms of time, education, manpower and money …… and the use of resources will have to balanced against the time used for treatment of patients” (Danish Medical Association 2007:1).
 
Summing up, the institutional changes in quality development have been developed over a period of almost 20 years through the collective efforts of many different actors. Central initiatives from the National Board of Health, initiatives from single counties, medical societies and the professional associations have been combined without any single actor as the most important until about 2000 and without any direct effect on professional autonomy. But the new Danish Model represents a move away from the network approach and the traditional autonomy of counties and professionals to a more top-down approach where external standard are imposed on all hospitals and professionals. The professional associations have participated in the construction of this model and have accepted the use of organisational standards and standard for patient satisfaction, but all things considered there is no doubt that professional clinical standards remain the most central element in the Danish model. The construction of standards has to a great extend involved the medical and nursing elites but it is still an open question if and how the autonomy of the individual professional will be affected and how the balance between professional, organisational and patient oriented quality regimes will be.

4.2 Institutional Changes and the Autonomy of Danish Civil Servants 
The institutional change subject for analysis of the profession of Danish civil servants is a change in their roles as advisers to Danish ministers. Since the beginning of the 1980’s the Danish civil service has reinterpreted its role as a professional civil service loyal towards the common good and moved from an  a-political role being reluctant to engage in providing political advice to their ministers to a role in which it primarily grant its loyalty to the minister and is able and willing to engage in the provision of political advice by integrating this type of advice with their professional advice​[1]​ (Salomonsen 2003). 

We first, briefly, discuss the civil servants as a profession. Second we describe the institutional context of the Danish civil service. Third we present the formal and institutional changes in the role of civil servants as advisers to ministers from the 1980’s onwards. The changes in the institutional role of the civil service is accompanied by, or intertwined with changes in the civil service’s institutional environments, which is why the analysis includes both institutional changes in the role as the advisory practices performed by the civil service as well as changes in the discussions of the role in the institutional environments. Fourth we characterise the change as a combination of an institutional change process which, using Hargrave and Van de Vens’s typology (2004) may be characterised as a mix between institutional design and collective action. Finally we discuss how the professional autonomy of the civil service has been affected by the institutional change.

4.2.1 Danish Civil Service as a Profession?
Although the civil service does not represent one of the traditional professions as for example medicine, civil servants as public managers have recently been discussed as a profession (Nordengraaf 2007). However, in the present article we do not analyse the civil service as a profession in terms of being public managers like Nordengraaf, but uses the case of Danish civil servants’ role as advisors to illustrate how the civil service acts as a profession However, we begin by a brief, general discussion on how the Danish civil service as advisers may be conceptualised as an occupational group which increasingly have been trying to identify and professionalise their advisory role as a trait specific to the Danish civil service, in order to preserve their monopoly as political advisors to the ministers. 

Firstly, as in most civil services in Western democracies, Danish civil service is characterised by a mix of different classical professions. The traditional professions represented in the civil service are generalists with an educational background primarily in law, economics or political science (Ministry of Finance 1998:42). Hence the civil service may not be characterised as a traditional profession with a mono educational background. Second the civil service has no official monopoly in relation to abstract analytic administrative work and its autonomy regarding their work in general is formally limited by hierarchical regulation and not primarily professional norms. Finally Danish civil servants do not have a classic professional organisation supporting their specific interest. However, the different professions represented in the civil service are represented by the same union, The Danish Association of Lawyers and Economists (DJØF), which acts as a guardian of the professional interests of civil servants e.g. by formulating an ethical code of conduct for civil servants (DJØF 1993). 

In spite of these formal traits Danish civil service may be characterised as a profession having autonomy and, as will be evident in the subsequent analysis, almost monopoly in the specific task of providing assistance and political advice to Danish ministers. The latter is especially the case for top civil service as the demarcation between politics and administration becomes blurred at the top of the hierarchy (Derlien 1993:40). Contrary to their colleagues in other Western democracies Danish civil servants do not to a very large extent share the advisory role with politically appointed advisers. Further in practice much of the administrative work is regulated by specific professional norms. Finally there is a general recognition of the existence of a strong culture specific to the civil service which, although living side by side with cultures specific to the different ministries, are regarded as central when explaining civil servants’ institutional roles and behaviour. The strength of the culture within the Danish civil service has recently been explained by Kettl, Pollitt and Svara as being a consequence of a small administrative elite in which “…almost everyone can know almost everyone else. This combined with a merit-based career service and a high security of tenure, tends to produce a strong culture, not easily disturbed or, indeed, re-shaped.” (2004:19). The high security of tenure was for a period of time challenged by the introduction of permanent secretaries being appointed for at set term of years, but today all permanent secretaries are again employed as officials (tjenestemænd), in order for permanent secretaries being able to contradict the ministers in advisory situations without risking their employment as civil servants (Interview with the agency head of The State Employer's Authority march 2009). 

The occupational monopoly of providing advice is reflected in the formal organisation of Danish ministries as being based on the principle of merits and hierarchies where top civil servants, including the permanent secretaries, primarily are recruited from within the national administration (Christensen 2006:1006). Hence, Danish civil servants have, contrary to their British colleagues, been able to prevent an increase in the external appointments (Du Gay 2008:244). The principle of merit within the national administration has been somewhat modified over time but it has survived as the prime principle for the recruitment of advisers of Danish ministers. 

Danish government is organised by the principle of ministerial governance with the ministers being the political head of the ministerial bureaucracy. This implies that ministers are formally able to select and recruit the civil servants of their ministries, including the permanent secretaries, who are the administrative heads of the ministries. However the Danish civil service is based on “…a long and unbroken tradition of merit bureaucracy.” (Christensen 2006:1001), where civil servants are recruited on a principle of merit and not by political or partisan appointments. Hence neither a change in minister nor in government “…legitimate a purge within the civil service. So even if political appointments are not expressly forbidden, they violate a distinct civil service tradition.” (Christensen 2006:1001). 

The merit-principle further implies, that Danish civil servants are regarded as apolitical and are obliged to act and appear as such outside the ministries as this “…supports the credibility surrounding their professional work and makes certain that future governments and ministers feel confident being advice by the same permanent civil service staff.” (Ministry of Finance 2004:277). 

4.2.2 The Institutional Context of Danish Civil Service
As reflected in the discussion of the civil service as a profession the Danish civil service is placed in a ministerial and national administrative context which may be characterised as highly institutionalised with a strong administrative tradition which have a regulative and normative effect on the behaviour and reconstruction of the institutional role of being a Danish civil servant. 

The institutional field of the civil service is constituted by the civil service itself as well as central actors in their institutional environments which are made up by the government, the parliament, their union as well as the media. The latter is primarily active when the civil service/minister relationship becomes subject for discussions which include the role and behaviour of special advisors. 

Often the professions relation to the state is a central dimension in the descriptions of the institutional environments of professions as the professions relative autonomy often depends on the extent and type of state regulation (Jespsersen 2005:68-69; Kuhlmann 2006). The distinction between professions and the state becoming blurred when professions are employed by the state and at the same time contributes to policy making and implementation in the same areas. The civil service’ relation to the state is, compared to other traditional professions, even more complex. The complexity is reflected in the fact, that the civil service on the one hand may be seen as representative of the state – and acts as representatives of the state in their interaction with other classical professions in society. But on the other hand they are themselves subjects of regulations from the government as well as the parliament. Looking only at the regulation of civil service advice, we do not, however, find a strong formal regulation. Neither the civil service’s general role nor their specific role as advisors is mentioned in the Danish constitution. In practice the advisory role of the civil service has been partly regulated by norms developed within the civil service and partly regulated by especially the parliament, which from time to time discusses and make inquiries into the advice provided by the civil service. An apolitical merit civil service has previously been the preferred choice of the parties forming the government and opposition alike (Christensen 2006, p.1004). However, as Danish governments are traditionally minority governments, the political constraints caused by the majority of the parliament constitute “...an important intervening variable…” (Christensen 2006:1014), and the parliament is thus a central institutional actor in the ministries environments in this respect.  

The highly self-regulated role of the civil service is reflected in the historic development of the civil service’s relation to the ministers. The formal organisation of ministerial governance was introduced by the Danish constitution in 1849. However, as mentioned, this did not provide any formal prescriptions regarding the role of the civil service and their relation to the minister apart from describing the minister as being politically responsible of the ministries. The relation between ministers and civil servants was from 1984 to 1901 ‘regulated’ by the fact that the civil servants shared political standpoint with the conservative governments, which among others meant that ministers were recruited from the civil service (Knudsen 2000a; 2000b). This period was characterised by not only cultural (Hood 2000:13), but as importantly political alignment between ministers and the civil service. In 1901 Denmark got its first liberal government, and the civil service had to serve ministers with whom they politically disagreed. As a consequence the Danish civil service withdraw themselves from the political spheres and aspects of their work and became a civil service which to a large extent resembled the Weberian ideal-type of a civil servant (Weber 2000). This clear division between politics and administration came, however, under pressure from the time around Second World War onwards. The pressure was caused by ministers demanding more political advice in order to perform their ministerial duties. From that time, the gradual changes towards civil servants being political advisors was introduced by the civil servants. Discussions of these changes were, before the 1990’s rare. However, in the mid 1960’s there were discussions of the division of roles between departments and agencies, which lead to a general recognition of the departments being not only an administrative body, but as importantly obliged to support the minister and his or hers policies and relations to the political system in general and the parliament and the media in particular (Report no. 301 1962; Smith 1994:25). The short description of the development of the role of the civil service illustrates the autonomy given to the civil service from the introduction of the constitution. I.e. the changes in the civil service’ relation to the minister is initiated primarily from the civil service it self. And although the civil service’s responsiveness towards ministers increasing demand for political advice is a response – it is, as will be evident in the subsequent analysis, a responds which enables the civil servants to protect their autonomy and almost their monopoly as advisors to the minister. I.e. it is a response which safeguards their professional interest. 

4.2.3 The Formal and Institutional Changes in the Role of Civil Servants as Advisers to Ministers From the 1980’s Onwards
The tradition of the civil service as described above has however only survived due to an institutional change in civil servants role as advisers to successive ministers and governments. As their colleagues in other western democracies Danish civil servants have been met by an increasing demand from their ministers for political advice. However, Danish civil servants, has, contrary to their colleagues in for example UK (Foster 2001; Kavanaugh et al 2006:chapter 12) been able to preserve their status as the prime political adviser of the minister, by preventing the introduction of a large number of political advisers. This is made possible because the Danish civil servants as a response to the increasing demand for political advice from their ministers, have been able to legitimise an increasing integration of their professional advice with political advice – both within their own professional tradition as civil servants as well as in their institutional environments, when the latter have raised serious discussions of the legitimacy of this more political roles of Danish civil service. In the next section we describe how the civil service has acted in order to safeguard their monopoly as the prime political adviser to the minister and prevent formal reforms of the organisation of advice within three periods of intense discussions in the environment of their changing advisory role. The periods are the beginning of the 1990’s, the end of the 1990’s and 2003 onwards.  

a) The Beginning of the 1990’s
In 1993 the Danish conservative lead governments was facing a scandal which have been labelled the Tamil-Case. The scandal began as the Minister of Justice was accused of illegalities in the administration of Tamil refugees. He was later convicted by an impeachment. Further the Prime Minister was accused of misleading the parliament (Folketinget), which ultimately leads to the resignation of the government. As part of the scandal civil servants were also criticized, and both the permanent secretary of the Ministry of Justice and later the permanent secretary of the prime ministers office had to resign. The general impression in the discussions of the civil servants was that they had not done enough to bring an end to illegal administrative practices and been excessively loyal to their political leaders. Although the incident did not concern civil servants increasing provision of political advice as such, political advice became a central issue in concurrent discussions of the minister/civil service relationship in the institutional environments of the civil service. The scandal was one of the reasons behind the formulation of the first ethical code for the civil service written in a Danish context: Professional ethical principles in public administration (DJØF 1993). The code was written at the initiative of DJØF, and was based on an extensive empirical enquiry among civil servants in the Danish public administration. One of the central conclusions of the empirical enquiry was that political advice was an unavoidable, necessary and also ethically appropriate aspect of the professional advice provided by top civil servants to their respective ministers (DJØF 1993). The ethical code became the first ‘formal’ step towards legitimising the hitherto pragmatic interpretation, that political advice was increasingly a part of the profession of being a civil servant. This was reflected in the fact that the code, initiated and written by the professional organisation of the civil service, was used by the Ombudsmand as well as by governments in subsequent parliamentary debates on the appropriateness of Danish civil servants provision of political advice to ministers (Salomonsen 2003:83). 

At that time we begin to find civil servants who in public argue in favour for the Danish system of apolitical advisors providing political advice. For example permanent secretary of the Ministry of Finance at the time points to the fact that that Danish civil servants ‘has to go far in the political in order to remain apolitical’ (our translation) in the journal published by DJØF (djøfbladet:1994/4:12). 

b) The End of the 1990’s 
The conservative lead government was in 1993 replaced by government led by Social Democrats. From 1993 onwards the opposition occasionally accused the new government of making patronage appointments when recruiting civil servants to the Prime Minister’s office (Salomonsen 2003:38-39). This led the parliament to form an expert committee in May 1997 in order to analyse not only party-patronage or partisan politicization (Rouban 2003) in the recruitment of civil servants but also the advisory role of the civil service (Ministry of Finance 1998:9). The expert committee included professors from public administration and law, top civil servants as well as a representative from DJØF (Ministry of Finance 1998:10). The committee was chaired by a former permanent secretary from the Ministry of Environment – a ministry which has an institutional history of being very responsive towards ministers need for political advice (Salomonsen 2003:241-252). In 1998, the committee published White paper no.1354/1998. The relationship between ministers and civil servants (Ministry of Finance 1998). The report became the next central step towards legitimising political advice as part of profession of being a civil servant. As the ethical code from 1993, the report was based on empirical enquiries on the advice provided by especially permanent secretaries and private secretaries (Ministry of Finance 1998). Once again, the conclusion was that, especially the permanent secretaries provided political advice to their ministers. The white paper further recognizes ministers need for such advice and like the ethical code describes political advice to be legitimate, but points out that this is a type of advice the civil service is obligated to deliver. It qualifies this point by noting that this obligation does not include political advice of a strictly party-political nature (Ministry of Finance 1998:21). Further the report makes it explicitly legitimate for ministers to employ a special adviser, as the report concludes, that although ministers in general are very satisfied with the professional and political advice provided by the permanent civil service, they find the advice on media and their political communication some what deficient. The employment of the special advisor should be tied to the minister’s term in office and she or he should be employed in ministers private secretaries without executive powers in relation to the permanent civil service, apart from the part employed in the private secretaries (Ministry of Finance 2004:270). Finally should the special advisor, as the permanent civil service, be subordinated the permanent secretary, although the special advisor should be given some latitude from the permanent secretary when providing advice to the minister (Ministry of Finance 2004:187).  

This period was also characterised by a professional debate where top civil servants publicly gave statements which supported the development towards an increasing provision of political advice. Again we find the at the time permanent secretary from the ministry of Finance arguing in favour of what he describes as the necessary and unavoidable professionalisation of the political advice in the Danish ministries (Eldrup 1997:113). A point which is supported by his colleague in the ministry of employment: 

”When I was a principal we still discussed whether civil servants should provide political advice. That discussion is passé today. There is a general accept among civil servants and politicians, that the advice should be total. The role includes both provision of political and professional advice.”  (Bo Smith in djøfbladet:2000/4:23) 

This point of view is also reflected in the following quotes given by the at the time permanent secretary at the Prime Ministers Office, Nils Bernstein in respectively a journal published by a professional organisation, Nordic Administrative Society, as well as in one of the major newspapers in Denmark Jyllands-Posten.

”A few years ago, I guess there were permanent secretaries who were not prepared to do it. But for the generation of civil servant who are in the positions today it is natural to engage in political advice too…the fact that top civil servants should be able to provide advice on not only professional, but also political issues is not something which I regard as a politicization but as a professionalisation.” (Nils Bernstein in Administrativ Debat:1999/1:5)


””Seen from the outside, it may be seen as a puzzle that a top civil servant is capable of whispering good advice into the ear of a social democrat on the one day and on the next of a liberal.” Nils Bernstein describes however that ability as pure professionalism. “In the national administration this is not experienced as something difficult. During the many years I have been working here, have I never experienced people having such difficulties.”” (Jyllands-Posten December 29 2002)

c) 2003 Onwards
In 2003, a second expert committee was set up by the parliament, The Expert Committee on Civil Service Advice and Assistance to the Government and its Ministers (Ministry of Finance 2004). This time the reason was not discussions of party patronage recruitments in the permanent civil service, but discussions about the regulation of the advice and behaviour of special advisers in relation to the permanent civil service and the media. However, it was also a part of the mandate to discuss whether further regulation of civil servants advice to the minister was needed. As in 1998, the expert committee consisted of representatives from the universities, the civil service and DJØF: This committee was chaired by a professor in law (Ministry of Finance 2004:17),who in previous discussions had expressed a pragmatic attitude towards the question of whether civil servants should provide political advice (e.g. Christensen 1997:17). In 2004, the committee published White paper no. 1443/2004 Civil servants advice and assistance. As in 1998, the conclusion regarding the advice provided by the permanent civil service was that it is legitimate for the civil service to provide such political counsel: 

“When the issue in question falls within the minister’s function as a minister, the permanent civil service can provide advice and assistance on both professional policy and political-tactical aspects of the issue. Political-tactical advice includes evaluations of expected attitudes toward the issue among various political parties and the public, as well as when and how the issue could most expediently be presented to the media, parliament and the public.” (Ministry of Finance 2004:279-280) 

Further the report concluded that there was no major need for further specification of the regulation of civil servants’ advice (Ministry of Finance 2004:35). 

Again the committee made empirical investigations of permanent secretaries’ and private secretaries’ advice to the minister, and again it concludes that especially the permanent secretaries provide political advice to their ministers (Ministry of Finance 2004:78). If further concludes, that the permanent civil service only to a limited degree has lost it monopoly as political advisers to the ministers, as the special advisers employed in the ministries after 1998 primarily provide advice regarding the ministers relations to the media, although a smaller group of the special advisers also engage in political advice (Ministry of Finance 2004:83). This corresponds with the conclusion that around half of the 14 special advisers employed in the ministries had a professional background in journalism (Ministry of Finance 2004:81). This pictures seems to continue as in May 2009, 9 out of 15 special advisers has a professional background in journalism or media science and 6 has a professional background in political science, and 3 of these 6 are explicitly described as political advisers to the minister (www.statsministeriet.dk (​http:​/​​/​www.statsministeriet.dk​)).

A final indicator on the extent to which the permanent civil service has lost it’s monopoly as the prime provider of political advise can be found in the fact that the report in 2004 expands the number of special advisers which ministers legitimately can employ to two or three but it also 
stresses the importance of keeping the permanent civil service as the prime political advisers to the ministers. 

“The Committee finds that there are important arguments in favour in keeping a very limited number of special advisers per minister. It is the Committee’s opinion that a greater number of special advisers in the ministries, especially if they are political advisers, could lead to a situation where special advisers become a unit of political-tactical advice that in an inexpedient manner is decoupled from the rest of the ministry’s policy advice and administrative procedures. A significant increase in the number of special advisers may consequently impede the ability of the permanent civil service to deliver integrated policy and political advice to the ministers, and the coherence of the advice and the implementation of policy could be weakened.” (Ministry of Finance 2004:284)

The protection of the integrated advice provided by the permanent civil service, it is further argued, is necessary, as this integration is highly demanded and appreciated by the Danish ministers (Ministry of Finance 2004:185). 

Concurrent with the expert committees, a number of civil servants were interviewed as part of a research on political advice in the Danish civil service (Salomonsen 2003). As in the public statements given in the 1990’s the civil servants in general use a rhetoric where political advice is described as part of a natural and professional development of the advice provided by the permanent civil service (Salomonsen 2003; 2004). This is illustrated in the following quotes: 

“The politicians expect political sparring to an even larger extent. And the solutions are different in different countries. You can choose to bring someone from your own party to provide the political sparring or, as in the Danish model, where the civil servants have said: we think that such advice falls within the further development of the classical role of civil servants, because the role has always included assisting the minister and serving as a secretary for the minister. We are employed to help the minister, the government, to realize its policy. (Interview at the Ministry of the Interior and Health).

“One should approach one’s work with professionalism. This is the quality of the Danish civil servants: we can provide political sparring as professionals. You can register what kind of political wishes the minister has, and then try to give an advice through that filter but the filter can be replaced by a different one tomorrow.” (Interview at the Ministry of the Interior and Health)
 
“…to me it is purely bureaucratic biology. It [political advice] has nothing to do with me sitting and politicizing – I’m sitting and doing archaeology. I try to se if the layers are the same or different. And if there are differences, how can I use the differences – and how can I promote the government’s point of view in the situation at hand.” (Interview at the Ministry of the Environment)

The quotes correspond with the public statements given by top civil servants as quoted in the analysis above. The descriptions of political advice reflects not only that political advice is institutionalised as part of the civil service self-understanding of being a professional civil servant and as a central trait of the Danish civil service profession. 

If one should point to different institutional logics when analysing civil services’ relation to their minister, one could argue that there exists to main logics. The first may be conceptualised as a merit bureaucratic logic which prescribes an apolitical role to the civil service. The second may be conceptualised as a politicized bureaucratic logic which may take at least three different forms: Firstly there is ‘party political politicization’ where we merit based criteria is substituted for political criteria in the selection, promotion, rewards, and disciplining of the civil service (Peters & Pierre 2004:2). Secondly there is politicization in the sense of civil servants taking on tasks that formerly (and formally) might have been considered to be political (Peters & Pierre 2004:3), which has been conceptualised as ‘functional’ or ‘institutional’ politicization (Schroeter 2007:2). A third type of politicization has been suggested by Rouban as civil servants involvement in the political life, as for example being present and active in political parties (2003:319). The descriptions also reflect how political advice is being legitimised by an institutional logic of pragmatism which combines elements from a merit bureaucratic logic with a elements from a politicized bureaucratic logic. Although the civil servants explicitly dissociate political advice from an institutional logic of politicization, functional politicization may be used to characterise the fact that civil servants in a merit bureaucracy engages in political advisory activities. 

4.2.4 Characterising the Institutional Change Process – a Mix between Institutional Design and Collective Action 
The change in the profession of civil servants towards a new institutional role as not only professional, but also political advisors is not a response to formal reforms. In stead it is initiated as a (strategic) response to an increase in the ministers’ demand for political and media assistance and advice. 

As reflected in the description above the change is initiated before the early1990’s as a process of institutional design in which the civil service themselves, as a single collective actor, informally reinterpret and change their role as advisers. This reinterpretation of the role of civil servants involves the construction of new institutional norms – or working rules – which address the unprecedented and increasing demand for political advice from the ministers by integrating political advice as part of the civil service profession. However the institutional design or construction of the role as political adviser is not the result of purposeful social construction and strategies. It is rather an institutional construction which, as described by Scott, ”…emerge from the collective sense-making and problem solving behaviour from actors confronting similar, problematic situations.” (2008:222). That is, however, not to say, that this sense-making and problem solving behaviour is in no way motivated by interests from the civil service, but these interests are not safeguarded by the civil service as a professions mobilizing their interests in the institutional field. At this point of time it is thus primarily the civil servants who acts the generative mechanism causing the institutional change, which enables them to protect their professional interest and autonomy of being the sole provider of political advice to the minister, and prevent a formal reform of the organisation of political advice in Denmark.

When the institutional change in the professional practices and norms regarding political advice becomes subject for intense political and public attention in 1993 onwards the new institutional arrangement of political advice had to be legitimised in the institutional environments. 

At this point of time dimensions of the collective action model are present, when the institutional arrangements characterising advice becomes subject for discussion and action by multiple institutional actors. As a consequence the civil service acts as partisan actors in order to protect their autonomy by framing these discussions in ways that support the initial change. Because the civil service has no formal regulatory power they can instead mobilize in order to preserve the organisation of advice and the permanent civil service interest in keeping the monopoly as advisors. They act as normative agents (Scott 2008:225) when top civil servants engages in the public and professional debate on the legitimacy of civil servants providing political advice, and by interpreting this as part of a professional advice (Salomonsen 2004). Further DJØF publishes the ethical code which acknowledges the need for civil servants to engage in political advice. At this point the “collective actor” is clearly present as the civil servants as well as their professional organisations acts collectively in order to protect the interests of the civil servants. However, this strategy changes as civil servants becomes part of the committees which in 1998 and again in 2004 formally legitimise and contribute to the institutionalisaton of the change in the advisory role of the civil service, not only in the civil service as such, as this had already taken place, but more importantly in their institutional environments. At these points in time the civil servants acts as both normative agents as well as becomes part of the committee which contributes to the formalisation of the norms already introduced by the civil service.  

These actions are taken, not as suggested in the collective actor model, in order to mobilize structures and opportunities for institutional reform, but in order to prevent such reforms which ultimately would break the monopoly of the civil service as political advisors to the ministers. The civil service to a large extent succeeds as number of special advisors has been kept constant as well as their influence on political advice seems at the face of it limited. However, as noted by Christensen, is it “…important to acknowledge that the current pattern is unstable, mixing political appointees with a partisan background with communication professionals.” (2006:1020).  

Hence we identify an institutional change process which may be characterised as a mix between institutional design and collective action. 

4.2.5 The Professional Autonomy of Civil Servants as Advisors 
Turning to the question of autonomy, the conclusion is, that the Danish civil service until now to a very large extent has been able to preserve their institutionalised monopoly of being political advisors to the minister. The preservation of the autonomy resembles a double social closure strategy, in which the professions introduced as special advisors are primarily journalists and this reflects at least formally their status as media and not primarily political advisors. Civil servants have preserved the organisational control of not only the prime access to providing and coordinating the political advice to the minister, but also by controlling the formal organisation of special advisors within the ministries as being firstly subordinate the permanent secretary and secondly having no executive power in relation to the civil service outside the ministers private secretary. 

Although the conclusion as the present time is that the Danish civil service to a large extent has preserved a classic professional autonomy, they are never the less constantly faced with the challenge of avoiding a situation of competitive professional autonomy where they end op being in open competition with special advisors on defining what is the appropriate working area of political advice versus that of media advice. 

5. Discussion
In this paper we have analysed two very different professions as already indicated in the introduction and the cases. The health care professions and especially the profession of medicine are almost the archetype professions belonging to the group of professions who apply professional knowledge to problems presented by clients (patients in this case). They are old professions, with a well-defined knowledge bases and officially recognized monopolies in relation to treatment and care for patients. The health care field is also a mature organisational field characterised by well-defined regulative, normative and cognitive institutions. The profession of civil servants is not, as the profession of medicine, recognized as a classic profession. However, we have argued that civil service may fruitfully be conceptualised as a new kind of profession enjoying autonomy in the development of the rules regulating their work as in this case advisors as well as how they are able to react when this monopoly is being challenged. This is partly made possible as the institutional field of the civil service is a field characterised by normative and cognitive more than regulative institutions. 

In what follows we first outline the differences and similarities of the institutional changes in our cases as we expected the professions to react in different ways according to different types of institutional change. Second we turn to the question of how the different changes affect the professional autonomy of the professions. The question of how the institutional changes are affected by the professions is addressed throughout the discussion. 


Different forms of institutional change
In both cases we identify institutional change as design. Both new management models and the new role for civil servants as political adviser have been designed, but in very different ways. The new management model design was made by purposeful action in governmental commissions and with the explicit aims of changing the traditional management models in the health care field and impose NPM inspired concepts of general management by top-down initiated change in a professionalised field. The implementation was left to the counties and the professions had to act locally in order to preserve autonomy.

In the case of civil servants we see another kind of design where the new institutional role of political advisor emerges from collective sense making processes in a civil service confronted with practical problems and public discourses about the role of civil servants. In this case the elite within the profession takes the lead in the sense making and legitimisation of the new role as political advisor, by constructing new institutional roles prescribed and reflected in new cognitive and normative institutional rules for their role as advisors. This pragmatic and informal way of institutional change corresponds with the characteristics of the civil service field which, as argued is characterised by a low degree of regulative institutions regulating the civil service’ tasks in general and their relationship to the minister in particular. In stead we find both cognitive and normative institutional rules.  

In the case of quality development the institutional change has been developed over a long period of time through the collective efforts of many different actors including the health care professions. It represents an example of change by institutional diffusion where different quality regimes are developed by different actors and later merged into the Danish quality model. This again reflects the characteristics of the health care field with numerous different kinds of actors, such as national and local authorities, medical societies and several professions. The construction of the new national model in 2002 represents a mix of institutional design and diffusion but no single actor dominated the process and the model contains different and somewhat contradictory quality regimes.

Changes in the autonomy of the professions
In the health care sector the institutional changes had the potential to threaten the classic autonomy of the medical profession. New management models and systematic quality development could have challenged their dominant jurisdiction in relation to general managers and nurses. They succeeded in preserving their autonomy in relation to management by local strategic collective actions taking advantage of the decentralised governance structure in the field. In relation to quality development they had to adapt to another kind of change with many different actors and quality regimes but still they seem to be in charge of the clinical standards and to preserve that clinical standards are the most important. The autonomy of the medical profession did however change over time and to day other professions (nurses and general managers) compete with doctors in relation to management but also in relation to quality regimes. The conclusion seems to be that the medical profession has maintained most of its autonomy but a small move towards competitive autonomy can be identified.

The situation of the nursing profession was different and they saw the new management models and systematic quality development as new areas for professionalisation and not as at threat to the professional autonomy. They got a better position in management and their understanding of quality development corresponded with the weight on total quality schemes in the new model. It seems that the nurses have maintained and maybe expanded their former autonomy by joining forces with general managers and politicians.

The autonomy of the Danish civil service in terms of being political advisors to the ministers was initially created by the civil service themselves as a response to ministers increasing demand for such advice. This autonomy was however threatened by accusations of partisan recruitments but increasing also by ministers being unsatisfied with the media advice provided by the civil service. By recognizing ministers need for professional media advice and acting proactively in the committees which legitimised and formulated the rules for special advisors roles and behaviour within the ministries Danish civil servants have been able to institutionalise a difference between media and political advice leaving the former to primarily journalists and the latter to themselves. By so doing they have to a large extent been able to protect their monopoly as political advisors to the minister. However this, until now, successful protection of their professional autonomy is potentially unstable as pointed out by Christensen (2006). This instability is reflected firstly reflected in the fact there are special advisors which explicitly and formally is being described as political advisors, and secondly as the division of media from political advice may be difficult to keep in an institutional environment where ministers’ political communication seems to be increasingly important for ministers’ ability to act and preserve their position as minister. Hence the civil service is expectedly confronted with the challenge of ending up in a situation of competitive professional autonomy when confronted with the special advisors in the day-to-day advice of the minister. 

Roles and strategies of the professions in the process of institutional change
In health care the two professions acted in different ways according to the different kinds of institutional change. Troika and joint management models were created by design and implemented locally. Confronted with this violation of the traditional management structure the medical profession maintained as their policy that doctors alone should manage clinics. At the same time they took collective, local and strategic action in order to create a compromise that preserved the management of medical treatments as a matter for doctors alone. In relation to quality development they first acted proactively as carriers of classic professional norms about the importance of evidence based medicine and clinical standards into the network of different actors and regimes. Later on, when the new national model was created by the national board for quality they participated in the construction of the new model with the help of the medical societies and again they adjusted their collective action and worked through other actors (medical societies) when convenient. Summing up the medical profession has been able to take advantage of the specific kind of institutional change and has modified, designed and changed their collective actions in order to preserve the core of their professional project and the modifications and changes in the institutionalisation. The same goes for the nurses except that they have not been threatened by the reforms but they have modified and changed their strategies if it could support their overall professional project about equal position with doctors. Overall we can conclude that in health care the fate of institutional change as well as its consequences for the professions autonomy can at least partly be explained by the impact of professions collective actions.

The role and strategies of the profession of the Danish civil service takes different forms in the course of changing the institutional roles as advisors to the minister. First their role is primarily designers of a new institutional role of integrating professional and political advice locally in their respective ministries. At this point of time they may presumably also act as carriers of this new institutional role in the civil service tradition, which becomes diffused as the administrative elite meet in formal and informal forums across ministries. As this ‘silent’ institutional change within the ministries becomes subject for public and political debate, they change their strategy by firstly openly arguing in favour of the Danish integrated model of advice and secondly engaging in the committees which discusses the legitimacy of this model of advice. Hence in the case of the civil service, not only the fate, but the institutional change itself as well as its consequences for the professions autonomy is to be explained by the impact of professions acting firstly in the shadow of the lack of bureaucratic rules regulating their role as advisors and secondly as partisan actors trying to protect their interest as well as autonomy of being political advisors by being part of the committees formulating pragmatic rules for this part of the civil service’s tasks. 

What seems to be common across two very different professions and fields is that different kinds of institutional change are met by different kinds of collective actions by the professions. In the civil service case the profession was active in shaping the institutional change through emerging sense making and legitimisation of already existing practices and in this way the profession participated proactively in the creation of the institutional change. But on the other hand we found a more traditional form when the medical profession reacted against a visible threat to their autonomy by strategic, visible and collective action directed against interpretations that did not respect the predefined professional position of doctors in management. Somewhere between these two are the reactions of doctors in relation to quality management. They change over time according to different types of institutional change and this shows that the professions at least in our cases are quite capable to change and/or modify their collective actions in the different types of institutional change processes if needed in order to protect change or expand the professional autonomy.


Summing up: what seems to be common across two very different professions and fields is that different kinds of institutional change are met by different kinds of collective actions by the professions. In the civil service case the profession was active in shaping the institutional change through emerging sense making and legitimisation of already existing practices and in this way the profession participated proactively in the creation of the institutional change. This seems to correspond with findings in recent studies about the changing roles of the professions facing institutional change. Greenwood, Suddaby and Hinings emphasize that legitimating of new ideas requires normative justification and that ideas have to consistent with prevailing values in the profession in order to be institutionalised (2002:75). Further they argue, that this process requires “…discourse both within and outside and organisational community.” (Greenwood, Suddaby & Hinnings 2002:76) – a point which in the case of the civil service becomes evident as the institutional changes in their advisory role becomes subject for public and political debate. Nordengraaf (2007) mentions that alternative ideas about professionalism are developed especially in the public domains and that present-day professionalism is characterised by seeking shared senses of direction and that different groups find different answers. The new role of civil servants giving political advice can be interpreted as a process where new senses of direction are created and justified and in this way contributes to the professionalisation of civil servants But on the other hand we also found more traditional forms of collective action when the medical profession reacted against the visible threat to classic autonomy by strategic, visible and collective action directed against interpretations that did not respect the predefined professional position of doctors in management and the medical conception of quality.

What is important here is however, that even if we found such reactions, professional ideas about autonomy and professionalism also changes This is partly due to institutional change as in our cases where new management models and quality regimes are imposed by design and dissemination. But as we have seen, competition with other professions and experts can result in collective action that that maintain professional powers to define health care management models and integrate quality management tools in health care professionalism (Kuhlmann 2006b; Blank & Bureau 2004; Levay & Waks 2009), as well as civil servants taking collective action in order to maintain their professional power to define what is appropriate political advice. This again might have consequences for the both the kind of professional autonomy and for the ways that professionalism is conceived.

6: Conclusion
That institutional changes can affect the professions autonomy is hardly surprising. Many studies have demonstrated that institutional changes especially those inspired by NPM strategies has been designed to change the autonomy of the professions. Lately it has been more common to study the reactions of professions confronted by institutional changes and to recognise that they in some case are able to exert a considerable influence by decoupling or translation of institutional change. But professions are different species which has consequences for the institutional changes they are confronted with as well as changes they are able to trigger themselves. What we have found by this comparative analysis is that we should not talk about professions as one single group of occupations. They live in different institutional environments, they perform different kinds of work and they initiate and are exposed to different kinds of institutional change. What we have found is also that no matter what kind of profession and institutional change the professions act collectively and professional actions affect the institutional change and contribute to the preservation or change of professional autonomy and professionalism itself. The characteristics of the field, the kind of institutional change and the collective actions of the professions seem to be connected in coherent sets each with its own character. The profession may not always be “the lords of the dance” (Scott 2008) but they know different dances and the can improvise when the music changes. 
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^1	  The concept of professional advice refers to the advice which is given on the grounds of the professional standards characterizing the civil servants profession. This means that “…the requirement of professional standards covers all forms of judgments and considerations based on professional insight into actual facts and relationships. General professionalism designated adherence to the professional standards that are generally recognized within a given academic field. For example, civil servants who conduct economic analyses must adhere to the recognized professional standards for such calculations.” (Ministry of Finance 2004:276). 
